经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析

Motivating Managers by Offering Stock Option,the Composition of Board of Directors,and Enterprises' Value——an Empirical Analysis Based on the View of Intrinsicalness

本文首次从内生性视角研究中国上市企业经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值的内生互动关系。遵循内生性的研究思路,选取高科技上市企业为研究对象,用其2001～2004年的数据构建均衡的平行数据为研究样本,采用固定效应模型、广义最小二乘法(GLS)和广义两阶段最小二乘法(2SGLS)进行实证检验。本文的实证研究结果主要包括以下几个方面:首先,经营者股权激励和董事会组成存在互动的影响关系,具体关系表现为经营者股权激励与独立董事比例存在显著的反向互动关系,而经营者股权激励和非执行董事比例存在显著的正向互动关系。其次,在考虑到经营者股权的内生性影响下,经营者股权激励和企业价值之间依然存在显著的区间效应。也就是说,无论以独立董事比例还是非执行董事比例表示董事会的影响,经营者股权激励与企业价值间都存在显著的倒U型曲线关系。该结果表明经营者股权激励和企业价值之间存在稳定的关系。第三,董事会组成与企业价值之间存在相互影响,具体表现为独立董事比例与企业价值间存在显著的负向互动关系,非执行董事比例与企业价值间存在正向互动关系,但是显著性要弱一些。总的说来,董事会组成和企业价值间存在互相影响,但是二者间的关系并不明确和显著。根据上述结论我们认为,在高科技企业中,独立董事侧重于对经营者进行监督,而非执行董事侧重于对经营决策进行指导和修正。这就是为什么经营者股权激励和独立董事比例间呈现负向关系,而与非执行董事比例间却呈现正向关系;以及董事会组成和企业价值间的关系不像经营者股权激励和企业价值间的关系那样稳定和显著的原因所在。

In this article,we have pioneered the use of intrinsicallness to study the built-in interaction among encouraging China's listed companies' managers' by means of giving stock option,the constitution of director board(CODB),and enterprises' value(EV).In our case study and test,we have adhered to the thought on the study of intrinsicallness,taken as the object of our study the high tech listed companies,used as our study specimens the balanced parallel data that are constructed by the data of the said enterprises of the year 2001 to 2004,and employed the methods of GLS and 2SGLS.The results of our case study include mainly the following points:(1)there exist interdynamic relations between Giving Managers' Stock Option As Encouragement(GMSOAE)and CODB,which are expressed in the fact that GMSAAE has an obvious counter-move interdynamic relationship to the proportion of independent directors,whereas GMSOAE has an obvious positive interaction with the proportion of non-executive directors;(2)under the influence of the intrinsicalness of GMSOAE,there still exists obvious interval effect between GMSOAE and EV;in other words,whether the influence of board of directors is expressed by the proportion of independent directors or non-executive directors,GMSOAE has an apparent inverted U-shape curve;that result indicates that GMSOAE bears stable relations to EV;(3)CODB and EV interact with each other,which finds expression in the fact that the proportion of independent directors has a positive interactive relationship--which,however,is somewhat less obvious--to EV;in general,CODB and EV interact with each other,but the relationship between the two factors is neither clear nor obvious.Founded on the above conclusion,we think that the fact that,in high-tech enterprises,independent directors have cast emphasis upon supervision of managers and non-executive directors put stress on guidance to and on revision of decisions on operation,is why there is a negative interactive relationship between GMSOAE and the proportion of independent directors whereas there is a positive interactive relationship between GMSOAE and the proportion of non-executive directors,and why the relationship between CODB and EV is not so stable and obvious as that between GMSOAE and EV.