风险投资中对企业家激励模型的研究

Study on the Incentive Model to the Venture Entrepreneur in the Venture Investment

风险投资体系中,风险资本家与风险企业家之间形成委托代理关系。风险企业家掌握着关键技术和风险企业的日常经营决策权,在风险投资过程有中举足轻重的作用。本文在委托代理模型的基础上探讨了对风险企业家的激励机制设计模型,研究了如何更好地激励企业家的积极性以降低代理风险,为风险投资业的发展提供了有益的启示。

There is a kind of principal-agent relationship between the venture capitalist and the venture entrepreneur in the venture investment system. The venture entrepreneur plays an important role in the venture investment because he has the key technique and the right to make a strategic decision on day-to-day operations in the venture firm. This paper analyze an incentive mechanism model to venture entrepreneur based on principal-agent model and study how to make a good inspirited effect to the venture entrepreneur through designing a kind of compensation contract to reduce principal-agent risk, providing some implications for venture capital industry.