道德判断与伦理学的情感主义化

The Moral Judgment in Context of the Theory of Knowledge of the 20th Century

道德判断的非认知化是20世纪伦理学非形而上学化的体现。传统认知主义道德判断以自然主义即主观主义和客观主义的划分特征,现代非认知主义道德判断则以直觉主义对自然主义的否定,以及情感主义对直觉主义的改进为标志。从价值的方面而不是从事实的方面来看待道德判断的性质,是现代伦理学区别于传统伦理学的主要特点。传统自然主义由于摩尔直觉主义的批判而走向衰落,情感主义借助哲学中语言学的转向实现了伦理学由传统向现代的转型。但另一方面,伦理判断是否一定表现为情感判断,由此而引起的分歧,又从更深的层次上反映出情感价值主义判断取向的不完善性。

One of the epistemological trends of ethics in 20th century is to give moral judgment through detailed inquiries in proper ways. Under this trend, the traditional ethical methods defining moral judgment by non-ethical things is replaced by the modem ones, which defines moral judgment by the valuable factor in itself. The traditional ethical naturalism correspondingly gives way to modem ethical valuablism. It may be said that the rise of emotionalism is at the right moment, comparing to the wane of traditional naturalism with being criticized by G. E. Moore＇ intuitionism. On the other hand, the divergent on whether ethical judgment is definitely showed as an emotional judgment or not reflects the imperfection of the valuable judgment of emotionalism.