治理机制、管理者行为与企业绩效关系的研究(英文)

The Relationship Between Governance Mechanisms,Managerial Behaviors and Firm Performance

基于代理理论,本文分析了治理机制(包括CEO补偿,CEO任期,领导权结构和所有权结构)与高层管理者行为的关系,以及它们对企业财务绩效和非财务绩效的影响.我们提出大多数治理机制对管理者关注能力发挥和关注企业长期发展的行为都有明显的影响.我们特别提出在不同的所有权集中度结构下,管理者行为的表现明显不同.当企业的所有权集中于少数几个大股东时,所有权集中度对管理者关注能力发挥具有正向作用,但是当企业的所有权集中于一个大股东时,所有权集中度对管理者关注能力发挥具有负向作用.同时,我们提出管理者关注能力发挥和关注企业长期发展对企业财务绩效和非财务绩效的改进都有明显作用.

Drawing on agency theory, this study analyzes the relationships between the governance mechanisms （including CEO compensation, CEO tenure, leadership structure and ownership structure） and top managers＇ behaviors as well as their effect on both financial performance and non-financial performance of the firms. We suggest that most of governance mechanism factors have significant effect on the leveraging of CEO＇s capabilities and the managers＇ orientation of the long term development for the firm. Specially, under different ownership concentration, this effect has obvious difference. When ownership concentration is considered as the ownership structure of a few （e. g. five largest shareholders） blockholders, the effect of the ownership concentration on the leveraging of CEO＇s capabilities is positive, but it has a negative effect when ownership concentrates on just one largest blockholder. Meanwhile, the leveraging of CEO＇s capabilities and the managers＇ orientation of firm＇s long term development has a significant positive effect on both financial performance and non-financial performance of the firms.