摘要
农业产业化组织中契约制是一种具有不稳定性特征的组织形式,我国契约制中的龙头企业和农户处于不完全信息状态,由此而引起的双方短期行为,导致了屡屡出现违约现象。以“信誉机制”这种市场力量和“专用性投资”方式增加企业和农户彼此的信任与依赖,使他们的利益趋于一致,可实现增强契约稳定性、降低风险的目的。
In industrialized management of agriculture, the contract is an unstable configuration of organization. The leading industries of agriculture and peasants have incomplete information and short-term actions, so they always break the contracts. Based on a game study of reducing breach of contracts, a conclusion can be drawn that prestige mechanism and special investment can strengthen stability of contract.
出处
《山东科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第3期72-75,共4页
Journal of Shandong University of Science and Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
博弈论
契约制
严格劣策略
game theory
contract
strictlydominated strategy
