证券发行制度的经济分析及评价

Analysis and Assessment of China Securities Offering System

我国证券市场的发行制度改革是一个不断深化的过程,政府管制是发行制度的一个核心问题。本文首次建立了一个基于塔洛克寻租模型的分析框架,分析证券市场的管制如何造成福利损失,提出了证券投资者剩余的概念,在价格管制条件下分析了证券投资者剩余在发行人和投资者之间的分配,证券市场只要存在数量控制,消除价格管制和福利分配公平之间不可能同时成为政策目标;并进一步分析了证券市场低价扩容在改进社会福利水平中的意义,从而为股权分置改革完成后证券发行制度的渐进改革思路建立理论基础。

State authority remains as the core issue with the deepening of securities offering system reform in China. As an analysis scheme, the author sets up a rent-seeking model to explain how state authority in securities offerings results in loss of social welfare. He promotes the concept of investor surplus and analyzes the distribution of investor surplus between issuers and investors at the context of pricing control. We conclude that elimination of pricing control and equal distribution of welfare will not be the concurrent policy goals so long as quantity control is in place. The author clarifies the effect of market expansion at low stock prices to social welfare improvement with a view to offer a theoretical basis to phase in reform of securities offering system at post full listing reform era