货币政策透明度、通胀偏差与预期成本

Transparency of Monetary Policy,Inflationary Bias and Expectations Costs

由于预期的形成是需要成本的,本文通过建立一个引入预期成本的简单模型,分析可得信息的开发和处理信息成本之间的权衡关系对货币政策博弈的影响。模型得到两个结论:一是提高货币政策的透明度可以降低通货膨胀率;二是在特定的情况下,越“保守的”中央银行可能会导致更高的通货膨胀。因此,为了减少由动态不一致所导致的通胀偏差,中央银行越保守,就应该越透明。

Because forming expectations is costly, this paper analyzes the effect of the trade - off between exploitation of available information and the costs of processing it on the monetary policy game by a simple model that involves the expectations costs. This model provides two results： one is the CB can contribute to low inflation by being more transparent ; the other is as a more conservative or independent CB can give rise to higher inflation under certain circumstances. So, in order to reduce inflationary bias induced by time inconsistency, the more conservative is a central bank , the more it should be transparent.