摘要
本文通过武昌鱼的案例,从国有上市公司部分民营化后国有法人大股东的高管和民营大股东之间的代理冲突出发,揭示武昌鱼重组之后业绩恶化的公司治理因素,并对两大股东实际控制人之间的合谋掏空现象,从制度背景方面提出了新的理论解释。
This paper focuses on the case of partly property reforming of a state owned listed company and analyses the economic conse- quences,especially the benefits and costs form the real controllers of both state and private block holders of this firm.Authors try to explain the relationship between the restructuring effect and agency problem from the two controllers.Finally this paper demonstrates that a series of institutional setting might provide to some extent explanatory power for this case.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第9期48-55,共8页
Accounting Research
基金
中央财经大学研究生科研创新基金重点项目(项目号05-Z-005)的阶段性成果。
