中国银行业隐性存款保险与资本充足监管机制下的联合效率分析

Joint Efficiency Analysis under China's Implicit Deposit Insurance and Capital Adequacy Regulation Mechanism

作为当代银行监管的重要手段,存款保险和资本充足率的重要性不言而喻,前人对于两者各自的监管效果及用途研究得已比较透彻,但对两者间的相关性和共同作用研究明显不足,本文在回顾前人研究的基础上,通过创造性地构建两者之间相关性的模型,得出了监管者如何选定适当的资本充足率监管水平使得银行在信贷过度冒险行为与过度审慎之间找到均衡,增进社会福利。同时结合当前中国隐性存款保险的实际背景,运用计算机仿真和曲线拟合进行实证,得出存在最优的资本使得社会福利最大化,在满足社会福利最大化的条件下,监管资本最佳与资本补充的外生成本两者不可得兼的重要结论。

As the most important modern banking supervision measures, former researchers have full --scale research on the effect and application of deposit insurance and capital adequacy respectively, however, these research overlook their mutual effect and relationship. Based on the former research, we build our model of these two measures in a creative way, and point out how regulator select proper level of capital adequacy to draw the equilibrium of banking over credit risk--taking and prudence, which enhances society welfare. Meanwhile, through carrying on the emulation of the computer emulation and curve fit, we point out that there exists optimal capital that can maximize social welfare, under this situation, optimal regulatory capital and exogenous cost of capital supplement can not be satisfied together on the background of Chinese recessive deposit insurance.