上市公司董事会监督机制替代效应对绩效影响的实证研究被引量：13

POSITIVE ANALYSIS∶EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE OF SUPERVISION MECHANISMS SUBSTITUTION EFFECT OF LISTED COMPANIES' DIRECTORATE

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摘要董事会的监督机制———领导权结构、董事会构成和董事会持股结构———对上市公司绩效影响不是孤立的,不同的监督机制的组合会对上市公司产生不同的绩效影响,同时在一定程度上存在监督机制之间的相互替代。公司绩效依赖于一系列董事会监督机制在维护公司整体利益问题上的效率性,而不是依赖于任何单一的机制。 The effect of directorate＇s supervision mechanisms-the structure of leadership, directorate, and directorate stock-holding——on performance of listed companies is correlated. Different combinations of supervision mechanisms have different effects on performance. There are substitution effects among the supervision mechanisms. Corporate performance relies on the efficiency of maintaining the whole interests by supervision mechanisms, not on any single one of the mechanisms.

作者徐二明张晗

机构地区中国人民大学商学院

出处《经济理论与经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第10期62-67,共6页 Economic Theory and Business Management

基金国家自然科学基金项目(70272036)

关键词公司治理监督机制董事会替代效应 corporation governance supervision mechanism directorate substitution effect

分类号 F271 [经济管理—企业管理] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

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