摘要
从契约的不完全性着手,运用违约租金的概念与博弈模型从交易特征、市场完善程度和企业规模等方面对履约过程进行了分析,指出不完全契约的履行主要依靠交易者的自我履约机制,该机制的作用机理是信誉贬值能够影响交易者的长期利益得失。
This paper argues that all contracts can＇t be complete in real world. It demonstrates incomplete contract by combining fraud rent and game model to analyze the process of contract - enforcing. It＇s an easy conclusion that contract - enforcing can rely on the mechanism of self - enforcing which means that the disrepute will deeply affect the fraud＇s long benefit.
出处
《技术与创新管理》
2006年第5期74-76,79,共4页
Technology and Innovation Management
