贸易保护政策的动态不一致性——以我国出口退税政策为例

Dynamic Inconsistency of Trade Protective Policy:Eviadence from Export Rebate Policies in China

本文从企业与政府之间博弈的视角,揭示贸易保护政策的动态不一致性问题。理论分析表明,在理性预期与信息不对称的假设前提下,政府在与私人企业的博弈中,往往处于劣势地位,容易受企业行为的牵引,其结果将导致贸易保护政策的动态不一致性。本文以我国出口退税政策的实施作为上述论断的经验证据,结果表明,出口企业的策略性行为可能是导致我国出口退税政策频繁变动的内在原因之一。

This paper primarily annotates the dynamic inconsistency of trade protective policy on the view of enterprises. Under the rational anticipation and asymmetric informaiion condition, the government who gambles with individuals is not in the greeen tree, but in the dry tree. Government is vulnerable to be draught by the individual＇s behavior, which finally leads to the dynamic inconsistency in the trade protective policy. This paper applies the reiteraion of export rebate policy in China as our experience analysis, and considers that the behavior of the export enterprise may be one of inherent reasons to the reiteration.