基于横向监督的联合激励合约

On Joint Incentive Contracts Under Horizontal Monitor

标准委托代理理论给出的独立激励合约只能实现二级最优努力,针对这一问题,分析了横向监督下即当独立代理人之间能够相互监督时的最优激励合约,指出同时基于个人产出和他人产出的联合激励合约能够在横向监督下实现一级最优努力.结果表明,横向监督使代理人之间能够签订隐性边合约,而第一阶段采用严格团体激励相容合约,第二阶段采用个体激励相容合约的动态联合激励合约机制,使得隐性边合约规定的报复机制既是可行的也是可信的,因此能够实现最优激励.

According to the problem that the independent incentive contracts relying on oneg own output, which is given out by classical principal - agent theory, only can realize the second best efforts, this paper analyzes the optimal contract under horizontal monitor by which independent agents can monitor each other, and comes to the conclusion that the joint incentive contracts relying on one＇s own output and others＇ean realize the first best efforts under horizontal monitor. The independent agents can sign implicit side contracts among them by the horizontal monitor and the dynamic joint incentive contracts, in which strict team incentive compatibility contracts are taken at the first stage and individual incentive compatibility contracts are taken at the second stage, make the retaliation mechanism regulated by implicit side contracts among agents feasible and credible, and hence can realize optimal incentives.