摘要
基于大股东控制所产生的控制权私人收益,我们通过一个严格的数学模型发现:由于大股东控制而产生的控制权私人收益将导致企业投资于高风险项目;大股东持股比例的增加将降低企业的投资风险;公司其他中小股东对大股东的制衡能力越强,公司的投资风险将会降低;相比于非生产性大股东的公司,生产性大股东的公司将会投资于更高风险项目。我们的研究对于认识大股东控制下的公司投资行为,以及通过如何改进股权结构,加强中小投资者利益保护具有重要意义。
We draws some conclusions as following by a strict mathematic model based on the private benefits of control led by control of large shareholder: (1)the benefits of control produced from the large shareholder's control will lead firm to invest in project with high risk;(2)the increase of the share's proportion held by the large shareholder will reduce firm's risk of investment;(3)the stronger that the power of other small shareholders restrict the large shareholder is,the lower that the firm's risk of investment is; (4)contrast to the firm with non-producing large shareholder, the firm with producing large shareholder will invest in project with higher risk. This study is heavily meaningful to understanding about the investing action of the firm controlled by large shareholder, and to take some steps to improve the share's structure so as to strengthen the safeguard for small shareholder's benefits.
出处
《经济研究导刊》
2006年第6期88-90,共3页
Economic Research Guide
关键词
大股东控制
控制权私人收益
投资风险
control of large shareholder
the private benefits of control
risk of investment