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最终控制股东控制权与现金流权偏离的实现机制 被引量:4

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摘要 在所有权集中的情况下,最终控制股东可以通过控制权与现金流权的偏离来转移公司财富以增加个人私利。并且当对投资者的保护较弱时,这种偏离的程度越大,最终控制股东掠夺的动机就越强烈。本文对最终控制股东控制权与现金流权分离的实现机制进行了分析。
作者 彭白颖
出处 《工业技术经济》 北大核心 2006年第10期74-76,共3页 Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
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