节水灌溉设施技术创新激励的博弈分析

An Analysis on Innovation of Water Saving Irrigation Facilities with Game Theory

用博弈论的方法从双寡头市场的角度探讨了供水企业在进行节水灌溉设施技术创新活动中的合作与不合作行为,分析了在这样的市场结构中节水灌溉设施技术创新的微观博弈机制。通过比较不同假设条件下供水企业进行节水灌溉设施技术创新的预期利润,得出了不同情形下的纳什均衡。

In this paper, the authors discuss water supply enterprises＇ ooperative and non -cooperative action of innovation in duopoly market with game theory, and also interpret the microcosmic game mechanism which have explained whether innovation would occur. By comparing expect profits of water supply companies from innovation of water saving irrigation facilities under different hypothesis, Nash equilibriums under different situation are analyzed.