摘要
从产品纵向差异的角度出发,考虑市场完全覆盖和市场部分覆盖两种情形,对单个厂商单产品、多产品质量歧视和两厂商两阶段、三阶段质量定价选择均衡策略进行了较全面的研究,得出了两种情形下单个厂商的最优质量价格选择、两厂商两阶段子博弈精炼均衡以及三阶段Stackelberg均衡策略,同时对质量边际效用、消费者离散情况下的质量价格确定进行了分析.最后以简单的算例对单个厂商产品策略进行了说明.
Based on product vertical difference, the quality choice problem of single product and multiple products of the single monopolistic manufacturers, the two-stage and three-stage strategies of the quality choice and pricing equilibrium of two manufacturers were discussed in covered and uncovered markets. The optimal quality choice and the pricing strategy of the single monopolistic manufacturers were deduced under different conditions, the subgame perfect equilibrium, and the three-stage stackelberg equilibrium of two manufacturers. At the same time, the marginal utilities of the different qualities and the strategies adopted in the discrete distribution of consumers were analyzed. Finally, a simple example was given to illuminate the use of strategies for multiple products under single monopolistic manufacturers.
基金
国家自然科学基金(70371023)
教育部博士点基金(20030358052)资助
关键词
产品选择
纵向差异
质量歧视
均衡策略
垄断厂商
product choice
vertical difference
quality discrimination
equilibrium strategy
monopolistic manufacturers