摘要
在捍卫其心灵主义版本的内在论时,康尼和弗德曼运用了认知辩明的伴随性命题。这一认识论上的伴随性命题和语言哲学及心灵哲学中的伴随性命题几乎平行。本文在介绍和分析普特南和博奇对关于语义内容和心灵内容的伴随性命题的批判论证的基础上,指出我们可以构造平行的论证来挑战认知辩明的伴随性命题。
In defending the immanentism of the philosophy of mind,Friedman uses the supervenient proposition which is almost parallel with the supervenient propositions of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind.This paper introduces and analyzes Putnam and Burge's supervenient propositions concerning the semantic content and the content of mind and points out that parallel argumentation can be constructed to testify the supervenient proposition of cognitive justification.
出处
《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》
2006年第5期43-50,共8页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition