我国现行个人所得税制的博弈分析

Game analysis of current individual income tax of China

在我国现行个人所得税制下,扣缴人、纳税人、征税人之间的博弈形成了不完全信息动态博弈。将博弈引入税收征管,结合我国的个人所得税以源泉扣缴为主的特点,建立博弈模型求解博弈均衡路径,不但可以检验我国个人所得税制是否达到立法者的预期,而且可以提供优化个人所得税征管机制的各项政策建议。

Under China＇s current individual income tax system, there exists incomplete information dynamic game among withholding tax collector, tax payer and tax collector. Bringing game to taxation management, combining the characteristics of China＇s withholding individual income tax as main source and establishing game model to solve game equilibrium path can not only test if China＇s individual income tax reaches expectation of legislators but also provide policy suggestion for optimizing individual income taxation management mechanism.