专利权人在不对称信息下的技术授权策略选择

Fees versus Royalties Licensing under Asymmetric Information

过去的研究显示,在专利权人不参与市场生产的情况下,定额权利金的收益将优于单位权利金的收益。本文得出,当被授权厂商存在成本上的私人信息时,专利权人最优的授权策略,有可能变成采用单位权利金的授权方式或定额加单位权利金的混合式授权方式。

In the literature on licensing, a major finding has been that licensing by means of a fixed-fee is superior to licensing by means of a royalty of the patent holder which is itself a non-producer. Our major contribution is to explain why the royalty plus fixed-fee was used. When the firm has private information of its own cost structure, the screening cost is existence and the fixedfee could not be the best option.