特许经营中的信任、承诺与风险被引量：1

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摘要特许经营加盟合作关系是一种特殊的组织学习机制和超市场契约安排,建立和维持这一关系需要信任和承诺作基础,同时也会面临一定的道德风险和经营风险。加盟双方保持经常性的沟通与交流、建立目标一致性机制、增加关系福利和关系终止成本、杜绝机会主义行为是防范特许经营加盟合作风险的重要途径。

作者肖怡

机构地区广东商学院管理学院

出处《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第19期65-68,共4页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

关键词特许经营信任承诺风险

参考文献7

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经济管理

2006年第19期

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