摘要
从电力管制者的角度,对一地区配电服务进行特许经营权竞标机制设计,设计了一套科学合理的竞标机制来提高电力管制者对特许经营权的配置效率。运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利;通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,进一步探讨了此机制在实际运作中的实现形式。
A franchise bidding mechanism is designed for a regional district distribution service from the view of the regulator. The main purpose of this paper is to design a set of bidding mechanism scientifically and reasonably to improve the allocative efficiency of franchise bidding. The model of bidding is established based on the incentive mechanism, which is to maximize the expected social welfare on the condition of participation and trtdy displaying the managing ability of the companies. Then, the optimal biding mechanism is obtained by solving the model. Furthermore, this paper discusses the practical application of the mechanism.
出处
《中国电机工程学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第20期39-44,共6页
Proceedings of the CSEE
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(60574071)
国家社科基金青年项目(05CJY019)~~
关键词
电力市场
配电管制
特许经营权竞标
多属性拍卖
激励机制
electric market
regulation of distribution
franchise bidding
multi-attribute auction
incentive mechanism
