银行市场约束与政府监管的权衡与选择研究——对我国银行外部监管效应的论证被引量：16

Tradeoff and Selection between Bank Market Discipline and Government Supervision

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摘要随着金融全球化和金融创新的发展,宏观系统性冲击造成了一系列银行危机。政府监管和市场约束作为银行外部监管体系的两个工具,其作用越来越受到重视。文章分析了在发生系统性冲击时如何在二者之间进行权衡和选择,从而达到最优的监管组合的效果,并针对中国的现实提出了政策建议。 With the development of financial globalization and innovation, systemic macroeconomic shock has led to a series of banking crises. As the two components of the external bank supervision system, official supervision and market discipline have received more and more attention. This paper analyzes the tradeoff and selection between the two so as to achieve an optimal supervisory combination, and puts forward suggestions for presentday China.

作者黄蕙

机构地区上海外国语大学国际金融贸易学院

出处《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第11期76-87,共12页 Journal of Finance and Economics

关键词银行市场约束政府监管系统性冲击权衡 bank market discipline government supervision systemic shock tradeoff

分类号 F832.1 [经济管理—金融学]

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