国家控股、超额雇员与劳动力成本：来自中国股票市场的经验证据

State - control, Overstaff and Labor Cost- Evidence from China＇ s Stock Market

与以往很多直接检验股权性质与公司价值的研究不同，本文从上市公司雇员行为角度研究了政府对不同类型公司行政干预的差异及其经济后果。经验证据表明，控股股东的所有制性质影响了上市公司受政府行政干预的程度，即国家控股公司比非国家控股公司雇佣了更多的职工；超额雇员导致国家控股公司承担了更高的劳动力成本，内部人支付自己高于市场水平的劳动报酬也增加了国家控股公司的劳动力成本。此外，还发现国家控股方式越直接，公司超额雇员越多，劳动力成本越高。因此，推进上市公司产权多元化改革和避免国家直接控股，对改善公司治理具有积极意义。

Different from many existing studies＇ direct testing of the relationship between stock ownership and corporate value, this paper starts from the listed companies＇ staffing behaviors to study whether there is a significant discrepancy of governmental intervention among different companies and whether it brings some direct economic consequences. Evidence suggests that the ownership of the controlling shareholders has an impact on the level of governmental intervention in the listed companies. State - controlling companies are staffed more heavily than the other companies, and the overstaffing makes the state - controlling companies assume greater labor cost than the others do. Meanwhile, the insiders pay themselves higher than the market level, which further increases state- controlling companies＇ labor cost. Besides, the more directly the companies are controlled by the government, the more heavily they are staffed and the higher labor cost they assume. The findings imply that it is meaningful to push the property diversification reforms and to avoid the direct state - control of the listed companies in order to improve corporate governance.