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委托代理模型在管制研究中的应用 被引量:7

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摘要 委托-代理理论主要研究委托人如何设计一个激励机制来诱导代理人按照委托人的利益行动,从而防止“逆向选择”和“道德风险”。委托代理模型在管制研究中分为三类,形成了三类激励机制:(1)管制者-被管制者的委托代理关系中存在“L-M”、“B-M”、“V-F”、“F-V”、“ISS”和“L-T(86)”机制;(2)国会-管制机构-被管制者的委托代理关系中存在“L-T(93)”机制;(3)新近出现了一批将信息结构内生化的研究。这些对于研究我国的管制问题具有重要的启示。
出处 《经济评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第6期115-119,共5页 Economic Review
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