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论银行业公司治理的特殊性 被引量:17

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摘要 尽管银行业的公司治理在实践中非常重要,但其理论基础却不甚明晰。我们认为正是银行业的特殊性使得银行业与一般企业的公司治理存在着重大区别。银行业的特殊性主要表现在:高杠杆率、资产组合的不透明性、存款挤兑的可能性以及存在外部安全网和严格的监管。基于上述行业特性,我们从投资者保护的视角试图建立银行公司治理特殊性的分析框架。分析的结论是:股东在银行公司治理中起基础性作用,但其作用不宜高估,市场约束与外部监管应保持平衡并相互补充,存款保险制度一定要有审慎的银行监管作支撑,而中央银行的最后贷款人角色则需斟酌使用。
作者 洪正
出处 《经济评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第6期125-133,共9页 Economic Review
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参考文献15

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二级参考文献25

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