摘要
利用实物期权的方法,本文分别建立了以股东利益最大化以及企业价值最大化为目标时的负债企业多元化投资模型。通过两种决策目标下多元化投资政策的比较,分析了负债代理下股东存在的投资决策非最优化问题。结果发现,若负债企业在投资前后都不存在债务风险,股东的投资决策将符合企业价值最大化原则;若投资能使债务由无风险变为有风险,企业将过度投资;若投资前后都存在风险,企业将投资不足。
This paper establishes diversified investment models of debt - financed firms aiming aim at maximizing equity value and firm value respectively. After comparing investment decisions under these two different objectives, it analyzes the non- optimization problem resulted from conflicts between equity - holders and debt - holders. The results reveal that, if there is no debt risk before and after diversified investment, those investment decisions maximizing equity value would maximize firm value at the same time. If investment could shift risk free debt to risk debt, equity-holders would over-invest in diversification projects. If there is debt risk before and after diversification, the firm would under-invest in diversification projects.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2006年第5期81-86,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372041)
关键词
负债融资
代理冲突
多元化投资
实物期权
debt financing
agency conflicts
diversification
real option.
