策略型过渡性制度安排——中国财政大包干体制研究

A Strategic Transitional Institution Azzangement——A Case Study about Fiscall All-zound Resposclility system of China in 1980s

改革决策在本质上是一种风险条件下的决策问题,为了控制改革风险,改革者可能会采取作为过渡性制度安排的改革方案。财政大包干就是我国预算管理体制改革过程中的过渡性制度安排,但因为它具有内在不稳定的特征,进一步加剧了业已存在的矛盾,削弱了中央财力和宏观调控能力,强化了地方的不规范行为。财政大包干是在改革的目标模式分税制已经明确以后所采取的一种策略安排,采取这种策略型过渡性制度安排的原因是各种制度改革之间的不匹配,即不协调成本的存在,目的是缓解不协调的矛盾,为下一步实施分税制创造条件,而中央政府掌握着改革主导权是这一策略能够成功的基本条件。

Kahneman and Tversky＇s respect theory of decisions under uncertainty indicates that people appear to be more adverse to losses, relative to their reference level, than attracted by gains of the same size. That is, people＇s preferences seem to be characterized by （local） loss aversion. A reform is essentially a decision-making under risk. Rational Decision makers choose transitional institutional arrangements for risk aversion that makes economic system change further in the face of least resistance. Fiscal all-round responsibility system is a kind of transitional institutional arrangement for budget management system transformation. Immanent instability in it intensifies the existed conflicts, weakens the central government＇s financial capability, and aggrandizes local states＇ anomalous behavior. Fiscal all-round responsibility system is a strategy after the reform made a target of tax distribution system. It can be called a strategic transitional institutional arrangement, which exists because of the coordination cost, i. e. , the cost on harmonizing different reform policies. It is the essential prerequisite that the central government has the reform leadership in its hand. If institutional transformation steps back, it might be a transitory phenomenon. It doesn＇t mean the failure of the reform or the retrogression of the transition progress. It should be a strategic transitional institutional arrangement chosen by the reformer because of the mismatching of differen the coordination cost.