订单农业发展中金融创新研究

Research on Financial Innovation in the Development of Contract Agriculture

目前关于订单农业高违约率的研究主要集中在运用企业组织理论、契约理论、交易费用理论、博弈论探讨其成因及解决措施,但多年来我国订单农业的运行状况仍鲜有改善。研究发现:高违约的根本原因在于订单农业交易系统的封闭性、风险的存量化以及农业风险特性与订单农业自身缺陷的交互作用,目前化解订单农业发展障碍的措施大多具有“堵”的性质,这不利于订单农业风险的分散,由此导致订单农业交易主体间激烈的“两性”冲突(指个人理性、集体理性)时有发生;提升订单农业履约率的根本途径不应仅仅采取“堵”的方法,更应该“疏”、“堵”并重,即在保留“堵”之有效的方法基础上,通过金融创新,寻求风险外化通道使风险流量化。

Contract agriculture has once fulfilled its unique function in settling the contradiction between ＂small-scale production＂ and ＂large-scale market＂, mitigating the blindness of farmers when making decisions, reducing the working costs and risks of agriculture industrialization, and boosting the income of farmers. However, from the end of 1990s, with the economic internationalization and the progress of the market economy, contract agriculture in its practice has exposed to the market its increasingly serious problems. It is found that throughout the country, over 800//00 of such contracts are broken, including the ＂company q- farmer＂ form. Although scholars have already lucubrated into the cause of such a high delinquency rate and brought forward a handful of solutions, for years the operation of contract farming in this country still remains unimproved. sought in order to discharge the risks on the basis of the effective portion of the blocking approaches. In this way, a mechanism for benefit distribution and risk allocation will be constructed on the basis of harmony between individual rationality and collective rationality. Based on such analysis, two combining transaction models, ＂ agriculture contract ＋ future market＂ and ＂agriculture contract ＋ option market＂, are brought about. The operations of these two models are effective in solving the problems mentioned above.