摘要
已有的对可转债发行动机的研究主要是基于股权分散假设、从现金流权利的角度进行解释。考虑到我国股权结构高度集中所导致的严重的控制权收益问题,从控制权收益的视角构建数理模型,证明了我国上市公司发行可转债的动机是控股股东通过获取控制权收益从而实现自身利益最大化,并进而对影响其发行动机的主要因素进行研究。
Former studies explained the motivation of issuing convertible bond （CB） on the basis of share structure decentralization theory and from the point of view of cash flow rights. In China, highly concentrated share structure induces vast private benefits of control rights. This paper develops a mathematic model from the point of view of control rights. It proves that the motivation of issuing CB in Chinese listed firms is the attempt to maximize controlling shareholders＇ own benefits by achieving excess control rights. Moreover, it studies the abnormal return of CB on the first exchange day and the factors resulting in such phenomenon.
出处
《当代经济管理》
2006年第5期114-119,共6页
Contemporary Economic Management
关键词
控制权收益
可转换债券
发行动机
异常收益率
private benefits of control rights
convertible bond
issuing motivation
abnormal return
