转型期中国城市职工下岗的非合作议价模型分析

A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model of Urban Unemployment in Transitional China

本文通过一个非合作议价模型,研究了禁止城市国有企业雇用农民工和允许其雇用农民工两种条件下城市职工下岗形成的机制。通过对比证明,一旦放开对于农民工就业的人为限制,工资将降到竞争性劳动市场的水平,在长期趋势下,会减少国企下岗的人数。通常一些城市采取的旨在保护城市劳动力免受外来农民工就业竞争的政策,反而导致了更多的城市下岗职工的存在。本文也证明了中国经济转型期失业的古典模型的性质。

With a non-cooperative bargaining model, this paper researches the forming mechanism of urban unemployment when state-owned enterprise （SOE） is prohibited from hiring rural labor and when it is not. Comparison between this two circumstances shows that once the artificial limits on rural labor＇s employment in city are loosened, wage will get down to the level as a competitive labor market, and the number of urban unemployment tend to decrease in a long term. Therefore, some cities＇ usual policies for urban labor market against rural labor lead to more urban unemployment rather than less. This paper also proves the unemployment characteristics of classical model in transitional China.