公司治理与掏空

Corporate Governance and Tunneling

本文采用非平衡面板数据模型检验了公司治理机制对控股股东掏空的影响。研究发现，独立董事对控股股东的掏空无监督效果；股权集中加剧了控股股东的掏空；股权制衡对控股股东的掏空无影响；管理者持股与基金持股均能抑制控股股东的掏空；国家控制没有加剧控股股东的掏空；企业集团控制加剧了控股股东的掏空；信息披露透明度和投资者保护均显著影响了控股股东的掏空；产品市场竞争是抑制控股股东掏空的有效机制。

This paper uses unbalanced panel data to test the impact of corporate governance mechanism on tunneling. Our research outcome suggests that independent board members and balance of stockholding have no monitoring effect on tunneling. Concentration of stockholding significantly increases tunneling and stocks held by corporate managers and funds decrease tunneling. There is no obvious evidence supporting the claim that firms controlled by the state suffer more from tunneling than other types of firms. In addition, firms with corporate groups as controlling shareholders suffer more from tunneling, and information disclosure and legal protection of investors significantly affect tunneling. Lastly, competition in the product market is one effective mechanism to prevent tunneling.