公共物品政府采购激励机制的研究

STUDY OF INCENTIVE MECHANISM IN PROCUREMENT OF GOVERNMENT OF PUBLIC GOODS

从政府采购经济的角度出发,分析了公共物品政府采购中效率损失的根本原因,针对政府采购中相关主体的利益冲突,在不对称信息和委托-代理理论的框架下,结合我国中小学教材的政府采购实践,引入拉丰-泰勒尔的逆向选择和道德风险模型创立了政府采购的最优激励机制,探讨了内部激励机制、双重道德风险下的最优激励机制以及风险态度与最优激励机制的关系,得出以下结论:我国现有的政府采购模式由于间接代理的原因存在效率的损失,但在理性约束下可以做一个次优的选择;激励的效果与代理人的风险态度相关,代理人越是厌恶风险,激励的效应就越不明显,反之亦然。

Based on the procurement economy of government, it analysed the reason of efficiency loss in procurement of government. It established the most optimization incentive mechanism on government procurement through combining the practice of government procurement of primary and middle school＇s teaching materials and leading Laffont-Tirole＇s antichoice and moral risk model, explored the relationship between the agent＇s risk attitude and incentive effects, and concluded as follows. Because of indirect agent mechanism, it exists efficiency loss in our current model of government procurement, and the incentive effects are highly related to the agent＇s risk attitude. The more the agent hates risk, the lower the incentive effects will be. The opposite it also right.