期刊文献+

非资产型第三方物流的两层次委托代理模型研究 被引量:7

Study on the two levels principal-agent contract of non-asserted third-party logistics
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摘要 根据非资产型第三方物流运作中委托代理关系信息不对称的特点,建立了非资产型第三方物流链的两层委托代理关系模型.分别给出了一对一和一对多两种模型的最优合约.对模型结果进行了分析,结合物流实践提出了防范委托代理风险的措施. According to the asymmetric information during the operation of non-asserted third-party logistics, the two levels principal-agent model is set up, and the optimal contract is provided. Based on the analysis of model result, the principal is able to design appropriate contract to decrease agent risk. Some specific means for removing the principal-agent risk are presented, and a new angle of view is offered for studying on the third-party logistics.
出处 《上海理工大学学报》 EI CAS 北大核心 2006年第5期427-431,共5页 Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70271005) 上海市基础研究重点项目(03JC14054)
关键词 非资产型第三方物流企业 委托代理模型 最优合约 non -asserted third-party logistics company principal -agent model optimal contract
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参考文献8

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二级参考文献13

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引证文献7

二级引证文献18

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