摘要
对中国A股上市公司2001～2004年之间202家权益融资事件以及102家债券融资事件的经验分析表明，与国外的资本市场一样，中国权益融资和债券融资也存在”公告效应”。我们的检验结果表明自由现金流量存在代理成本、负债具有“控制机制”而且管理者以往的经营行为也会影响自由现金流量的代理成本。
This paper investigations 202 equity issues announcement and 102 debt issues announcement in Chinese A-share listed companies over period 2001-2004, as overseas capital market, we find negative reactions by shareholders to the announcement that a firm intends to issue common equity and debt in china, This paper presents evidence that shareholder reaction is consistent with the predictions of the theory of agency costs of free cash flow,, Further, we find that the bonding of cash flow through debt issues mitigates the concerns of shareholder about the misuse of funds, Finally, managerial reputation for not abusing free cash flow may reduce agency costs .
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第9期61-67,共7页
Systems Engineering
关键词
自由现金流量假说
事件研究法
托宾Q
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
Event study Methodology
Tobin Q
