摘要
传统经典的股利理论都把现金股利政策看做实现股东价值最大化的工具,并通过市场的反应对其进行检验。但是,它们都忽略了公司的“法律”性和控制权对现金股利政策的影响。现金股利政策是公司“法律”之一,它是控制权人意志的体现,渗透着控制权人的利益倾向,现金股利政策可能成为公司控制权人利益侵占“隧道”的挖掘工具。控制权人利用现金股利挖掘利益侵占“隧道”可能有三种情况:经营者对股东利益侵占“隧道”的挖掘、大股东对小股东利益侵占“隧道”的挖掘、公司对债权人利益侵占“隧道”的挖掘。在我国还存在着一种特殊的利益侵占“隧道”———非流通股股东对流通股股东利益侵占的“隧道”。
Traditional classical dividend theories regard cash dividend policy as a tool to realize the maximization of sharehold ers'benefits and test it with the reaction of market. However they have all ignored corporate "laws" and the influence of control right on cash dividend policy. Cash dividend policy is one of the corporate "laws" and embodies the will of corporate controllers and the benefit trend of corporate controllers. It can become the corporate controllers'tool to excavate benefit -seizing "tunnels". There are three ways for corporate controllers to make use of cash dividends to excavate benefit - seizing "tunnels" : the managers excavate "tunnels" to seize the benefits of shareholders, large shareholders excavate "tunnels" to seize the benefits of small shareholders, corporation excavate "tunnels" to seize the benefits of creditors. In our country there is another special "tunnel" to seize benefits - the "tunnel" of shareholders of non - tradable shares to seize the benefits of the shareholders of tradable shares.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期74-76,107,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
现金股利
控制权
利益侵占
“隧道”挖掘
cash dividend
control right
benefit seizing
"tunnel" excavation