摘要
会计师事务所如何通过合并实现良性的规模化发展,是近年来我国会计市场管理与实践的重要课题。2001年国内最大的本土事务所中天勤的关闭促使我们反思该宗知名的“强强联合”案例伴随的潜在问题。本文的证据显示:在合并形成中天勤以前,深圳中天的上市客户群风险比天勤客户群更高,质量控制状况(采用签字注册会计师的签字集中度衡量)比天勤更薄弱;在合并后,合并双方的质量控制指标差距进一步拉大,且未观察到合并双方作出适当的质量控制与整合。我们认为,中天勤合并双方的合并前风险不匹配与合并后整合缺陷,抵消了合并的预期积极作用,从内因的角度为中天勤合并后的迅速灭失现象提供了一种解释。
It is a key issue for Chinese accounting firms how to expand their size through combination while without introducing risks wherefrom.The well-known Zhongtianqin Combination failure in 2001 motivates us to explore quality control issues surrounding this case.We find that before the combination,Shenzhen Zhongtian (one of the two combining parties) is associated with higher client-portfolio risks and poorer firm-level quality control than Tianqin (the other combining party) is.We are not able to find indicators of the quality-control integration between two combining parties after the combination,either.The evidence suggests that the pre-combination mismatch in client risk between two combining parties and the post-combination lack of quality-control integration probably offset expected strengths through the combination and contribute to the unexpectedly rapid ending of Zhongtianqin.Suggestions regarding the accounting firm combination are addressed for regulators and practitioners.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第10期79-85,共7页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于注册会计师个体视角的中国证券市场审计行为研究"(项目批准号70602020)的阶段性成果。