经理人市场失灵与家族管理转型的制度困境

Manager Market Failure and Institutional Dilemma of Family-Oriented Management Transition

由家族企业向现代经理式企业演变是企业发展的一般规律,也是家族企业规模扩张的必然要求。但是在我国经理人市场失灵的现实条件下,引入外部经理人将使家族企业面对经理人的选择风险和经理人的道德风险。本文通过一个博弈模型证明,家族化管理因家族成员的高度信任具有情境的合理性。

The transition from family firms to modern corporate entities tends to be inevitable especially with their increasing scale.However,under the manager market failure in China,the introduction of external managers in family firms would result in choice hazard for managers and moral hazard.This article shows that family-based management has situational rationale due to high trust among family members through a game model.