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代理理论与公司治理综述 被引量:23

A Literature Survey on Agent Theory and Corporate Governance
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摘要 委托—代理理论是目前公司治理研究中的主流分析框架,也是指导现实实践的一个重要理论根据。传统委托—代理理论所关注的是如何缓解股东与经理人之间的信息不对称程度,但是现实实践表明,公司治理中大股东与中小股东之间也存在着隐性代理关系。本文就代理理论在公司治理中的发展过程及逻辑进行了总结,并对代理理论发展方向进行了预测。 Agent theory is the main analysis framework for corporate governance and important tool in designing corporate governance mechanism.Traditional corporate governance researches focus on ways to release information inequality between shareholders and managers.However,the reality shows that hidden proxy between major and minor shareholders exists.This article surveys the evolution and rationale of corporate governance in agent theory and outlooks the future directions of it.
作者 闫冰
出处 《当代经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第6期80-85,共6页 Modern Economic Science
关键词 代理 公司治理 大股东 Proxy Corporate governance Major stockholder
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参考文献18

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二级参考文献44

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