摘要
通过R&D投资,联盟成员可以获得进行价值创造所必需的学习能力,但在获得学习能力之后,联盟成员也就具备了实施机会主义策略的条件。通过一个简单的博弈模型,本文发现,如果联盟成员的R&D投资具有承诺的特点,那么,联盟伙伴就不会实施这种机会主义策略,而且这种承诺会与学习能力一起决定每个联盟成员的知识投入水平。最后,利用本文的结果和方法还可以解释中外合资公司中诸如外资的独资化等现象。
By their R＆D investments, alliance members can obtain the learning capacities necessary to create value for them through knowledge-sharing alliances, but these learning eapacitiea can also lead to the opportunism. By a simple model of game, this paper finds that if the commitments can be produced through these R＆D investments, then alliance partners will not exhibit the opportunism and each member＇s level of knowledge input can also be determined by these commitments and the iearning capacities together. Finally, some phenomena, such as the tendency of foreign capital＇s exclusive investments in Sino foreign joint ventures can also be explained by using the results and method of this paper.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2006年第6期50-54,共5页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70472039
70571063)
陕西省教育厅人文社科专项基金资助项目(05JK044)
关键词
知识共享联盟
互补性
学习能力
承诺
knowledge-sharing aLLiances
compolementarity
learning capacity
commitment
