监管博弈与我国农村合作医疗存续研究

The Analysis on Intendance Game and Rural Cooperative Medical System(CMS) Continuance in China

文章以制度监管博弈为视角,以政府、医疗机构和农户为主体,分析合作医疗制度监管有效和不完全有效对农村合作医疗监管和被监管主体行为的影响,得出监管博弈的均衡状态与检查成本、罚金、违规收益、查出违规的概率、违规受到处罚的概率和罚金比例有关,并分析了其内在相关机理。在监管博弈分析基础上,提出通过完善合作医疗制度、引入供方有序竞争、增强农民共济意识等措施,来解决监管难题,保证农村合作医疗制度的持续运作。

Construction of the new-type Rural Cooperative Medical System （CMS） is consumingly enforced, and the entral government has also required the CMS should be elementary completed. However, as the history and praxis shows the continuance of CMS is low This study focus on the problem, and with the Game Theory, this study analyzes the intendance of the main bodies in the game. and then,give some advice to accelerate the continuance of the CMS.