摘要
逆向物流具有准公共物品的特征,由此决定了它还具有正外部效应和负外部效应。正是由于负外部效应的存在,导致逆向物流系统的资源配置达不到帕雷托最优状态。本文在界定逆向物流外部效应的基础上,提出了政府干预逆向物流以实现外部效应内在化的措施,指出了政府干预的利弊,并对此过程中政府和企业的博弈关系进行了分析。
Reverse logistics has positive externality on account of its feature of quasipublic goods. However, it also brings negative external effect. The resource configuration of reverse logistics cannot be perfect. As a result, pareto-optimality can't be gained. On the base of defining the externality of reverse logistics, the connotation and characteristic of the externalityare also revealed in this paper. In order to internalize the externality, government should take actions to correct the external effect of reverse logistics. The advantages and disadvantages of government intervention are pointed out. The game between government and enterprises is analyzed in the paper.
出处
《交通运输工程与信息学报》
2006年第4期76-81,共6页
Journal of Transportation Engineering and Information
关键词
逆向物流
外部效应
政府干预
Reverse logistics, externality, government interference