对存在广告溢出效应出口企业进行补贴的理论依据

An Analysis of Subsidizing Domestic Export-Oriented Oligopoly with Advertising Spill-Over Effect

本文探讨在产品市场上分属不同国家的企业在出口市场进行产量竞争,且产品广告投入存在溢出效应的情况下,本国政府对本国企业广告投入进行补贴的有效性。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,本文对由补贴(征税)政策、企业广告投入、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业广告投入进行补贴尽管会产生财政投入效果的“溢出”,但仍然有利于增加本国企业的产量和本国社会福利水平。

The paper provides an explanation for subsidizing advertising investment to domestic export-oriented oligopoly under quantity competition condition. Using backward induction solution and two-stage game twice, we induce the subgameperfect equilibrium of a three-stage game which composed of domestic tax （or subsidy） policy, firms＇ advertising investment and output or profit decision. The conclusion includes that the subsidy policy would induce the outputs of all firms increasing, and the domestic society welfare improving accordingly.