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Verification of Authentication Protocols for Epistemic Goals via SAT Compilation 被引量:1

Verification of Authentication Protocols for Epistemic Goals via SAT Compilation
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摘要 This paper introduces a new methodology for epistemic logic, to analyze communication protocols that uses knowledge structures, a specific form of Kripke semantics over hostile networks. The paper particularly focuses on automatic verification of authentication protocols. Our approach is based on the actual definitions of a protocol, not on some difficultto-establish justifications. The proposed methodology is different from many previous approaches to automatic verification of security protocols in that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e., finding bugs in a protocol. The main idea is based on observations: separating a principal executing a run of protocol from the role in the protocol, and inferring a principal's knowledge from the local observations of the principal. And we show analytically and empirically that this model can be easily reduced to Satisfiability (SAT) problem and efficiently implemented by a modern SAT solver. This paper introduces a new methodology for epistemic logic, to analyze communication protocols that uses knowledge structures, a specific form of Kripke semantics over hostile networks. The paper particularly focuses on automatic verification of authentication protocols. Our approach is based on the actual definitions of a protocol, not on some difficultto-establish justifications. The proposed methodology is different from many previous approaches to automatic verification of security protocols in that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e., finding bugs in a protocol. The main idea is based on observations: separating a principal executing a run of protocol from the role in the protocol, and inferring a principal's knowledge from the local observations of the principal. And we show analytically and empirically that this model can be easily reduced to Satisfiability (SAT) problem and efficiently implemented by a modern SAT solver.
出处 《Journal of Computer Science & Technology》 SCIE EI CSCD 2006年第6期932-943,共12页 计算机科学技术学报(英文版)
基金 This work is supported by the National Grand Fundamental Research 973 Program of China under Grant No 2005CB321902, the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 60496327, 10410638 and 60473004, German Research Foundation under Grant No. 446 CHV113/240/0-1, Guangdong Provincial Natural Science Foundation under Grant No. 04205407, and KAISI Fund in Sun Yat-Sen University.
关键词 authentication protocol formal verification knowledge structure SAT authentication protocol, formal verification, knowledge structure, SAT
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