摘要
哈贝马斯用“总体化”批判来概括霍克海默与阿多诺在《启蒙辩证法》中对启蒙理性进行的反思,将其视作马克思意识形态批判的极端化。总体化批判本应完成对启蒙的启蒙,但不幸的是,总体化批判不仅摧毁了批判的理性基础,使批判陷入尼采式虚无主义,而且将启蒙反思变成反启蒙,使其在自我指涉的反思中迷失方向。对于哈贝马斯的批评,学术界仁者见仁,智者见智。究其缘由在于,哈贝马斯与霍克海默、阿多诺使用相同的概念,如“理性”、“启蒙”、“现代性”等,但却做出了不同的理解,而研究者出发点的差异又无意识地扩大了理解上的歧见,使得共识更难达成。
Habeimas summarizes Horkheimer and Adorno's reflections on enlightenment expressed in their The Dialectics of Enlightenment as total Critique, and regard it as the radicalization of Marx's ideological critique. Total critique was supposed to enlighten the Enlightenment about itself. However, it not only pull down the rational foundation of critique and banish itself into Nietzsche's nihilism, but also changes Enlightenment-reflection into counter-Enlightenment and loses "its orientation in self-referential reflection. Scholars hold different views in their criticism of Habermas for the reason for the main reason that they used same concepts, such as reason, Enlightenment and modernity etc, but.gave different interpretations of them. Furthermore, different perspectives held by scholars have enlarged the discrepancy of interpretations without their knowing it. As a result, no consensus has been reached among scholars.
出处
《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期30-36,共7页
Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)