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政府在社会博弈中的角色与作用——一个基于霍布斯、洛克理论的模型分析 被引量:1

The Role and Action of Government in Social Game:An Analysis Based on Hobbesian and Lockean Models
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摘要 文章基于霍布斯和洛克的理论框架,讨论了政府在社会博弈中的角色和作用,并且阐发了社会博弈中政府与公民所面临的策略选择及均衡结果的社会意义,尤其对于社会契约关系中退出机制的安排和由此引发的重新谈判问题进行了深入的思考,为进一步研究关于社会契约的治理及其结构性安排等问题奠定了基础。 Based on Hobbesian and Lockean theoretic frame, this paper discusses the role and action of government in social game, and elucidates social connotation of selective strategies that government and citizen are facing in social game. Especially it ponders over the arrangement of exit mechanism and renegotiation in social contracts, and establishes foundation for further study in social governance structure of social contracts.
作者 闫大卫
出处 《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2006年第12期96-105,共10页 Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词 社会博弈 政府 社会契约 退出机制 重新谈判 social game government social contract exit mechanism renegotiation
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参考文献9

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二级参考文献31

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