摘要
有一支反实在论通过技术或其它原因引起的强幻觉(真实与虚假在认识论上是原则地不可分辨的)来驳斥“物质实体实在论”。但这样的论证必须证明:1、如果这样的强幻觉是可能的,那么,实在论就是错误的。2、这样的强幻觉是可能的。在剖析翟振明相关论文的过程中,本文表明:1与2都是错误的。因此,通过幻觉来否定实在论的做法根本行不通。虽然这并不意味着反实在论的最后崩溃,但本文最后将论证一个对实在论更为有利的结论:我们知道“我们并没有生活在虚拟实在中”这句话是真的。
Some of the anti-realists argue against the realism about material substance in terms of the existence of the strong illusions which is,in principle,indiscr im inable from real situations.Such an argument in fact includes two parts:1.If the strong illusions mentioned above are possible,then what the realist says i s false;2.The strong illusions are possible.This paper shows that neither 1 no r 2 is true.And so this kind of anti-realism is baseless.Besides,a proposi tio n favorable for the realist is justified in this paper,which says:“We do kn ow the sentence'we do not live in the virtual reality' is true.”
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第6期39-44,共6页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature