金融监管公共利益理论及其质疑

Theory and Question of the Public Interest of Financial Monitoring

金融监管公共利益理论认为现代经济不存在纯粹的市场经济,自由竞争的市场机制不能带来资源的最优配置,甚至造成资源的浪费和社会福利损失,因而肯定政府干预的合理性和有效性。既然监管目标是合理的,那么监管实施的结果应让大多数社会成员满意,可是,事实上一些监管实施的结果只让那些受益于监管的人们满意,监管机构面临的任务很难完成甚至不可能完成;市场理论能令人信服地解释社会资源通过个人追求私利的交易活动得到有效配置的机制,而与之相对的金融监管公共利益理论却无法描绘公共利益得以实现的具体途径。

The public interest of financial monitoring theory believes that pure marketing economic doesn＇ t exist in modern economy, marketing mechanism full of free competition doesn＇ t bring optimal allocation of resources, moreover, it will lead to the waste of resources and the loss of social welfare. Therefore, there is a support to rational and effective government intervention. In the meanwhile, reasons can be found to question the public interest theory of financial monitoring. If the objective of monitoring is rational, the result of it should be satisfactory. However, the result of monitoring will only ben- efit a certain interest group. The task facing by the monitoring institutions is hard and impossible to achieve; Marketing theory is convincing in explaining that social resources will be effectively allocated in the process that individual try to pursue interest. In contrast, the public interest theory can not describe the method in detail.