摘要
运用信息经济学与产业组织理论的相关原理对中美两国职业篮球竞赛市场各利益主体间的委托代理关系进行了实证分析,得出美国职业篮球竞赛(NBA)市场通过激励和约束机制的设计和相应的制度保障构建了俱乐部业主与NBA总裁、俱乐部业主与俱乐部总经理两个层次委托代理机制;我国职业篮球竞赛(CBA)组织机构与俱乐部业主之间的委托代理关系不清晰,职业俱乐部经理人与俱乐部业主之间的委托代理关系中缺乏通过制度、契约所建立的运行通畅的激励与约束机制,CBA联赛组织与赛事经营公司之间以有限合作的契约方式所建立起的委托代理关系在机制设计上具有创新价值。
Adopting information economics and industry organization theories, this paper compared the trust agency relationships between the benefit subjectives of both the American and the Chinese professional competition markets. It was found that the NBA markets were at the club owner and the NBA president level and at the club owner and club manager level through the incentive and the limitation systems and othe systems. The relationships between the CBA and the club owners were not clear. There were incentive or limitation systems to regulate the relationships between the club managers and club owners. It was a new way for the CBA organization and the competition operation compnay to operate by contract.
出处
《武汉体育学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第12期45-49,共5页
Journal of Wuhan Sports University
基金
湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究规划项目阶段性成果(2006y199)
关键词
职业篮球
竞赛市场
委托代理关系
激励机制
约束机制
professional basketball
competition market
trust agency relationship
incentive system
limitation system