会计信息披露管制的有效性

The Validity of Regulations on Accounting Information Disclosure

会计信息披露制度起源于企业所有权与经营权分离和委托代理关系的形成。尤其是1929年发生的经济危机对美国乃至世界经济产生巨大影响,会计信息披露问题备受关注。1933年美国成立证券交易委员会(SEC),作为一个独立的管制机构进行会计信息披露管制,并授权美国会计师协会制定会计准则,填补了自律性行业规范和相关法律之间的空白,至此行业自律性规范管制、准则(制度)管制、法律管制的多层次会计信息披露管制模式形成,后相继被其他一些国家借鉴。19世纪60年代以后,随着有效市场理论的提出、发展和完善,为会计信息披露制度的完善提供了更为坚实的理论基础。但是,不论从国内还是国外看,政府对会计信息披露的管制并没有收到人们预期的效果。文章从会计信息披露的动机出发,运用博弈论方法分析会计信息披露各方的策略行为,得出会计信息披露的适度管制的结论。

The Accounting Information Disclosure System can find its root on the separation of corporate ownership and management, as well as the formation of the relationships between principles and agents. Especially, the economic crisis which took place in 1929 had great influence on the economy of U. S. and the world around. As a result, more attention was paid to accounting information disclosure problems. As an independent control institution, Securities and Exchange Commission （SEC） was established in 1933 in America which is r accounting information disclosure and has the authority to authorize American Accountant Association to set accounting standards. Accounting standards fill in the gap between self - discipline industry norms and related legal policies. So far, industry self-discipline norm regulations, standard （system） control and legal control constitute a multi - hierarchy accounting information disclosure regulation mode, and thereafter the mode is successively used by some countries. After 1960s, the presentation and development of effective - market theory provide more solid foundation to perfect accounting information disclosure system. However, accounting information disclosure regulation did not reach the expected effects by neither domestic nor foreign governments. Based on the motivation of accounting information disclosure, and by using game theory analysis as an analyzing tool, the paper discusses the strategies and behaviors of each interest party, and comes to the conclusion that accounting information needs moderate regulation.